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Abstract. Existing systems for metadata-hiding messag-
ing that provide cryptographic privacy properties have
either high communication costs, high computation costs,
or both. In this paper, we introduce Express, a metadata-
hiding communication system that significantly reduces
both communication and computation costs. Express is
a two-server system that provides cryptographic secu-
rity against an arbitrary number of malicious clients and
one malicious server. In terms of communication, Ex-
press only incurs a constant-factor overhead per message
sent regardless of the number of users, whereas previous
cryptographically-secure systems Pung and Riposte had
communication costs proportional to roughly the square
root of the number of users. In terms of computation,
Express only uses symmetric key cryptographic primitives
and makes both practical and asymptotic improvements on
protocols employed by prior work. These improvements
enable Express to increase message throughput, reduce
latency, and consume over 100× less bandwidth than Pung
and Riposte, dropping the end to end cost of running a
realistic whistleblowing application by 6×.
1 Introduction
Secure messaging apps and TLS protect the confidentiality
of data in transit. However, transport-layer encryption does
little to protect sensitive communications metadata, which
can include the time of a communications session, the
identities of the communicating parties, and the amount of
data exchanged. As a result, state-sponsored intelligence
gathering and surveillance programs [1, 2, 3], particularly
those targeted at journalists and dissidents [4, 5, 6, 7],
continue to thrive. Anonymity systems such as Tor [8], or
the whistleblowing tool SecureDrop [9, 10], attempt to
hide communications metadata, but they are vulnerable to
traffic analysis if an adversary controls certain key points
in the network [11, 12, 13].
A host of systems can hide metadata with cryptographic
security guarantees (e.g., Riposte [14], Talek [15], P3 [16],
Pung [17], Riffle [18], Atom [19], XRD [20]). Unfor-
tunately, these systems generally use heavy public-key
cryptographic tools and incur high communication costs,
making them difficult to deploy in practice. Another class
of systems provides a differential privacy security guar-
antee (e.g., Vuvuzela [21], Alpenhorn [22], Stadium [23],
Karaoke [24]). These systems offer high throughput and
very low communication costs, but their security guaran-
tees degrade with each round of communication, making
them unsuitable for communication infrastructure that
must operate over a long period of time.
This paper presents Express, a metadata-hiding commu-
nication system with cryptographic security that makes
both practical and asymptotic improvements over prior
work. Express is a two-server system that provides crypto-
graphic security against an arbitrary number of malicious
clients and up to one malicious server. This security guar-
antee falls between that of Riposte [14], which provides
security against at most one malicious server out of three
total, and Pung [17], which can provide security even in
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the single-server setting where the server is malicious.
Express only uses lightweight symmetric cryptographic
primitives and introduces new protocols which allow it to
improve throughput, reduce latency, consume over 100×
less bandwidth, and cost 6× less to operate compared to
these prior works.
Express architecture. To receive messages via Express,
a client registers a mailbox with the servers, who collec-
tively maintain the contents of all the mailboxes in the
system. After registration, the mailbox owner distributes
the address of its mailbox (i.e., a cryptographic identifier)
to its communication peers via some out-of-band means.
Given the address of a mailbox, any client can use Express
to upload a message into that mailbox, without revealing
to anyone except the mailbox owner which mailbox the
client wrote into. Mailbox owners can fetch the contents of
their mailboxes at any time with any frequency they wish,
and only the owner of a mailbox can fetch its contents.
Crucially, Express hides which client wrote into which
mailbox but does not hide which client read from which
mailbox. This requires mailbox owners to check their
mailboxes at a fixed frequency, although there need not be
any synchronization between the rates that different owners
access their mailboxes. As we will discuss, this form of
metadata privacy fits well with our main application:
whistleblowing.
Technical overview. We now sketch the technical ideas
behind the design of Express. As in prior work [14],
Express servers hold a table of mailboxes secret-shared
across two servers; clients use a cryptographic tool called
a distributed point function [25] to write messages into
a mailbox without the servers learning which mailbox a
client wrote into [26, 14]. This basic approach to private
writing leaves two important problems unsolved: handling
read access to mailboxes and dealing with denial of service
attacks launched by malicious users.
The first contribution of Express is to allow mailbox
reads and writes to be asynchronous. This allows Express
clients to contact the system with any frequency they like,
regardless of other clients’ behavior. In contrast, prior
systems such as Riposte, Pung, and Vuvuzela [14, 17, 21]
require every client to write before any client can read,
so the whole system is forced to operate in synchronized
rounds. We are able to allow read/write interleaving in
Express with a careful combination of encryption and
rerandomization. At a high level: any client in Express
can read from any mailbox, but each read returns a fresh
re-randomized encryption of the mailbox contents that
only the mailbox owner can decrypt. In this way, even if
an adversary reads the contents of all mailboxes between
every pair of client writes, the adversary learns nothing
about which honest client is communicating with which
honest client.
The second major challenge for messaging systems
based on secret sharing [27, 28, 29, 30, 14, 31] is to
protect against malicious clients, who may corrupt the
functioning of the system by submitting malformed mes-
sages. Since no server has a complete view of the message
being written by each client, servers cannot immediately
tell if a message is well-formed, e.g., whether it modifies
only one mailbox or overwrites the contents of many mail-
boxes with garbage, destroying real messages that may
have been placed in them. Express protects against such
denial-of-service attacks using a new auditing protocol.
In a system with n mailboxes, Express’s auditing proto-
col requires only O(λ) communication between parties,
for a fixed security parameter λ, as well as O(1) client
side computation (in terms of AES evaluations and fi-
nite field operations). The analogous scheme in Riposte
requiredΩ(λ√n) communication andΩ(√n) client compu-
tation [14], and additionally required a third non-colluding
server to perform audits. In practice, our new auditing
scheme reduces overall computation costs for the client by
8× for a deployment with one million registered mailboxes.
In addition to defending against malformed messages
aimed at corrupting the whole database of mailboxes,
Express must protect against targeted attacks. A malicious
client could potentially send a correctly-formed message
containing random content to a single mailbox in hopes
of overwriting any content written to that mailbox by an
honest client. We defend against this by assigning virtual
addresses to each mailbox. Each mailbox is accessed via
a 128-bit virtual address, regardless of the actual number
of mailboxes registered. The servers store and compute
only over the number of actually registered mailboxes, not
the number of virtual mailboxes. However, since virtual
addresses are distributed at random over an exponentially
large address space, a malicious client cannot write to
a mailbox unless it knows the corresponding address.
Section 4 describes our protections against malicious
clients in detail.
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Evaluation application.We evaluate Express as a system
for allowing journalists and their sources to communicate
while hiding their communications metadata from network
surveillance. In this application, a journalist registers
a mailbox for each source from which she wishes to
receive information. The journalist then communicates
her mailbox address to the source via, for example, a
one-time in-person meeting. Thereafter, the source can
privately send messages to the journalist by dropping them
off in the journalist’s Express mailbox. In this way, we can
implement a cryptographically metadata-hiding variant of
the SecureDrop system [10].
To provide whistleblowers with any reasonable guar-
antee of privacy, Express must provide its users with a
degree of plausible deniability in the form of cover traffic.
Otherwise, merely contacting the Express servers would
automatically incriminate clients. As we will demonstrate,
Express’s low client computation and communication costs
mean that an Express client implemented in JavaScript
and embedded in a web page can generate copious cover
traffic. Browsers that visit a cooperative news site’s home
page can opt-in to generate cover traffic for the system by
running a JavaScript client in the backgound – thereby
increasing the anonymity set enjoyed by clients using
Express to whistleblow – without negatively impacting
end-users’ web browsing experience. We discuss this and
other considerations involved in using Express for whistle-
blowing, e.g., how a journalist can communicate a mailbox
address to a source, in Section 6.
We implement Express and evaluate its performance on
message sizes of up to 32KB, larger than is used in the
evaluations of Pung [17], Riposte [14] and Vuvuzela [21].
Recent high-profile whistleblowing events such as the
whistleblower’s report to the US intelligence community’s
inspector general [32] (25.3KB) or last year’s anonymous
New York Times op-ed [33] (9KB) demonstrate that mes-
sages of this length are very relevant to the whistleblow-
ing scenario. We also compare Express’s performance to
Pung [17] and Riposte [14], finding that Express matches
or exceeds their performance, and conclude that Express
reduces the cost in dollars of running a metadata-hiding
whistleblowing service by 6× compared to prior work (see
Figure 8). On the client side, Express’s computation and
communication cost are both independent of the number of
users, at about 20ms client computation and 5KB commu-
nication overhead per message, enabling our new strategies
for efficiently generating cover traffic. This represents over
100× bandwidth savings compared to Riposte [14] and
over 7, 000× savings compared to Pung for one million
users. Although Vuvuzela operates under a very different
security model, we compare the two systems qualitatively
in our full evaluation, which appears in Section 7.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
• The design and security analysis of Express, a
metadata-hiding communication system that signifi-
cantly reduces both communication and computation
costs compared to prior work.
• A new auditing protocol to blindly detect malformed
messages that is both asymptotically and practically
more efficient than that of Riposte [14] while also
removing the need for a third server to perform audits.
• An implementation and evaluation of Express that
demonstrates the feasibility of our approach to
metadata-hiding whistleblowing. Our open-source
implementation of Express is available online at
https://github.com/SabaEskandarian/Express.
2 Design Goals
This section introduces the architecture of Express and
describes our security goals.
An Express deployment consists of two servers that
collectively maintain a set of locked mailboxes. Each
locked mailbox implements a private channel through
which one client can send messages to another who has
the secret cryptographic key to unlock that mailbox.
To use Express, a client wishing to receive messages
first registers a mailbox and gets a mailbox address. From
then on, any client who has been given the mailbox address
can write messages to that mailbox, and the owner of that
mailbox can check the mailbox for messages whenever it
wants. We discuss how clients can communicate mailbox
addresses to each other via a dialing protocol in Section 6.2.
We consider an attacker who controls one of the two
Express servers, any number of Express clients, and the
entire network. The main security property we demand
is that, after an honest client writes a message into a
mailbox, the attacker learns nothing about which mailbox
the client wrote into. We also require that an attacker who
controls any number of malicious clients cannot prevent
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honest clients from communicating with each other. In
other words, we protect against malicious clients from
mounting in-protocol denial-of-service attacks. We do not
aim to protect against DoS attacks by malicous servers,
nor against network-level DoS attacks.
2.1 Express API
Express allows clients to register mailboxes, read the
contents of mailboxes they register, and privately write to
others’ mailboxes. Clients interact with the servers via the
following operations:
Mailbox registration. A client registers a new mailbox
by sending the Express servers distinct mailbox keys. The
servers respond with a mailbox address. We say that a
client “owns” a given mailbox if it holds the mailbox’s
keys and address.
Mailbox read. To read from a mailbox, the client sends
the mailbox’s address to the Express servers. The servers
respond with the locked (i.e., encrypted) mailbox contents,
which the client can decrypt using its two mailbox keys
together.
Mailbox write. To write to a mailbox, a client sends a
specially-encoded write request to the Express servers that
contains an encoding of both the address of the destination
mailbox and the message to write into it. No single Express
server can learn either the destination address or message
from the write request.
2.2 Security Goals
Based on the demands of our application towhistleblowing,
Express primarily aims to provide privacy guarantees for
writes and not for reads. For example, Express hides who
whistleblowers send messages to, but it does not hide
the fact that journalists check their mailboxes. Below we
describe Express’s core security properties, which we
formalize when proving security in Appendix A.
Metadata-hiding. We wish to hide who a given client is
writing to from everyone except the recipient of that client’s
messages. To this end, our metadata-hiding security guar-
antee requires that for each write into an Express mailbox,
no adversary who controls arbitrarily many clients and one
server can determine which mailbox that write targeted
unless the adversary owns the target mailbox.
We formalize this requirement in Appendix A, where
we show that an adversary can simulate its view of honest
clients’ requests before seeing them, which proves that the
adversary learns nothing from the request that it couldn’t
have generated on its own. In particular, this means the
adversary does not learn the mailbox into which the request
writes. Although a malicious server can stop responding
to requests or corrupt the contents of users’ mailboxes, we
require that even an actively malicious server cannot break
our metadata-hiding property.
Soundness. Express must be resilient to malformed mes-
sages sent by malicious clients. This means no client can
write to a mailbox it has not been authorized to access,
even if it deviates arbitrarily from our protocol. We capture
this requirement via a soundness game which we describe
in Appendix A, where we also prove that no adversary
can win the soundness game in Express with greater than
negligible probability in a security parameter.
2.3 Limitations
Express allows mailbox owners to access their mailboxes
and retrieve messages with whatever frequency they desire,
but they must check mailboxes at regular intervals in order
to maintain security because Express does not hide which
mailbox a given read accesses. If a mailbox owner changes
her mailbox-checking pattern based on the contents of
messages received, this may leak something about who is
sending her messages. Note that although this implies that
mailbox owners should regularly check their mailboxes,
it does not impose any restrictions on the frequency with
which any owner checks her mailboxes – it is not a fixed
frequency required by the system and can be different for
each mailbox owner. This is in contrast with prior works,
which fix a system-wide frequency with which clients
must contact the servers or require clients to always remain
online. Clients sending messages through Express but not
also receiving messages (e.g., whistleblowers sending tips
or documents) have no requirement to regularly contact
the system.
Another reason for mailbox owners to check their mail-
boxes regularly is that messages in Express are written
into mailboxes by adding, not concatenating, the message
contents to the previous contents of the mailbox. It is thus
possible for a second message sent to the same mailbox to
overwrite the original contents, causing the content to be
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clobbered when someone eventually reads it. This risk can
be easily mitigated, however, because each mailbox is for
one client to send messages to one other client, and servers
zero-out the contents of mailboxes after they are read
to make space for new messages. Looking ahead to our
application, messages can be a leak of a single document,
wheremore than onemessage is not required. If a journalist
expects to receive many messages from the same source
before she has a chance to read and empty the contents of
a mailbox, one way to handle this situation is to register
several mailboxes for the same source, so each message
can be sent to a different mailbox. This way, as long as a
journalist checks and empties her mailboxes before they
have all been used, no messages will be overwritten.
3 Express Architecture
This section describes the basic architecture of Express.
Section 4 shows how to add defenses to protect against
disruptive clients, and Section 5 states the full Express
protocol. Section 6 discusses how to use Express for
whistleblowing, including how a mailbox owner commu-
nicates a mailbox address to senders and how to increase
the number of Express users by deploying it on the web.
The starting point for Express is a technique for pri-
vately writing into mailboxes using distributed point func-
tions [25, 26, 14]. We review how DPFs can be used for
privatewriting in Section 3.1. A privatewritingmechanism
alone, however, does not suffice to allow metadata-hiding
communication. We must also have a mechanism to handle
access control so that only the mailbox owner can access
the contents of a given mailbox. We discuss a lightweight
cryptographic access control system in Section 3.2, where
we also explain how this combination of private writing
and controlled reading enables metadata hiding without
synchronized rounds.
3.1 Review: Private Writing with DPFs
We briefly review the technique used in Riposte [14] for
allowing a client to privately write into a database, stored
in secret-shared form, at a set of servers.
A naïve approach. In Express, two servers – servers A
and B – collectively hold the contents of a set ofmailboxes.
In particular, if there are n mailboxes in the system and
each mailbox holds an element of a finite field F, then
we can write the contents of all mailboxes in the system
as a vector D ∈ Fn. Each server holds an additive secret
share of the vector D: that is, server A holds a vector
DA ∈ Fn and server B holds a vector DB ∈ Fn such that
D = DA + DB ∈ Fn.
Once a client registers a mailbox, another client with
that mailbox’s address can send messages or documents to
the mailbox, which the mailbox owner can check at his or
her convenience. Although Express can support mailboxes
of different sizes, size information can be used to trace a
message from its sender to its receiver, so Express clients
must pad messages, either all to the same size or to one of
a few pre-set size options.
To write a message m ∈ F into the i-th mailbox naïvely,
the Express client could prepare a vector m · ei ∈ Fn,
where ei is the ith standard-basis vector (i.e., the all-zeros
vector in Fn with a one in coordinate i). The client would
then split this vector into two additive shares wA and wB
such that wA + wB = m · ei , and send one of each of these
“write-request” vectors to each of the two servers. The
servers would then process the write by setting:
DA← DA + wA ∈ Fn DB ← DB + wB ∈ Fn,
which has the effect of adding the value m ∈ F into the
contents of the ith mailbox in the system.
The communication cost of this naïve approach is large:
updating a single mailbox requires the client to send n
field elements to each server.
Improving efficiency via DPFs. Instead of sending such
a large message, the client uses distributed point functions
(DPFs) [25, 34, 35] to compress these vectors. DPFs
allow a client to split a point function f , in this case a
function mapping indexes in the client’s vector to their
respective values, into two function shares fA and fB
which individually reveal nothing about f , but whose sum
at any point is the corresponding value of f . More formally,
let fi∗,m : [N] → F be a point function that evaluates to
0 at every point i ∈ [N] except that f (i∗) = m ∈ F. A
DPF allows a client holding fi∗,m to generate shares fA
and fB : [N] → F such that:
(i) an attacker who sees only one of the two shares learns
nothing about i∗ or m, and
(ii) for all i ∈ [N], fi∗,m(i) = fA(i) + fB(i) ∈ F.
Moreover, in addition to supporting messages m ∈ F, the
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latest generation of DPFs [34] allow for any message m ∈
{0, 1}∗. When using these DPFs with security parameter λ,
each function share ( fA and fB) has bitlength O(λ log N +
|m|). In addition to general improvements in efficiency
over prior DPFs, our choice of DPF scheme will enable
new techniques that we introduce in Section 4.
In essence, the client can use DPFs to compress the
vectors wA and wB, which reduces the communication
cost to O(λ · log N + log |F|) bits, when instantiated with
a pseudorandom function [36] using λ-bit keys. Upon
receiving fA and fB the servers can evaluate them at each
point i ∈ [n] to recover the vectors wA and wB and update
DA and DB as before.
3.2 Hiding Metadata without Synchronized
Rounds
Private writing alone does not suffice to provide metadata-
hiding privacy. In order to achieve this, we also need to
control read access to mailboxes. Otherwise, a network
adversary who controls a single client could read the
contents of all mailboxes between each pair of writes
and learn which client’s message modified which mailbox
contents, even if messages are encrypted. Prior works
such as Pung [17] or Riposte [14] prevent this attack by
operating in batched rounds in which many clients write
messages before any client is allowed to read. The key
feature that allowsExpress to hidemetadatawithout relying
on synchronized rounds is that a message can only be read
by the mailbox owner to whom it is sent. Express can
make messages available to mailbox owners immediately
as long as (1) the messages remain inaccessible to an
attacker who does not own the mailbox whose contents
have been modified and (2) the attacker cannot tell which
mailbox has been modified if it does not own the modified
mailbox. Thus, all we need to successfully hide metadata
without rounds is a mechanism for access control that
satisfies these two requirements.
Express includes a lightweight cryptographic approach
to access control that relies on symmetric key encryption,
does not require the servers to undertake any user authen-
tication logic when serving read requests, and enables
useful implementation optimizations. A client registering
a mailbox uploads keys kA and kB to servers A and B
respectively, and the servers encrypt stored data using the
respective key for each mailbox, decrypting before making
modifications and re-encrypting after. The re-encryption
ensures that the contents of every mailbox are rerandom-
ized after each write, so an attacker attempting to read
the contents of a mailbox for which it does not have both
keys learns nothing from reading the encrypted contents of
the mailbox, including whether or not those contents have
changed. This property still holds even if only one of the
two servers carries out the re-encryption, so its security
is unaffected if a malicious server does not encrypt or
re-encrypt mailboxes. Our implementation encrypts the
contents of mailboxes in counter mode, so re-encryption
simply involves subtracting the encryption of the previous
count and adding in the new one. Since these operations
are commutative, we can implement an optimization where
re-encryption is not done on every write but only before
each read. This makes our approach – which requires
only symmetric key encryption – more efficient than a
straightforward one based on public key encryption, e.g.,
where the contents of each mailbox are encrypted under
the owner’s public key when a read is requested.
4 Protecting Against Malicious
Clients
The techniques in Section 3 suffice to provide privacy
if all clients behave honestly, but they are vulnerable to
disruption by a malicious client. In the scheme described
thus far, onemalicious client can corrupt the state of the two
serverswith a singlemessage. To do so, themalicious client
sends DPF shares fA and fB to the servers that expand into
vectors wA and wB such that wA + wB = v ∈ Fn, where v
is non-zero at many (or even all) coordinates. A client who
submits such DPF key shares can, with one message to the
servers, write into every mailbox in the system, corrupting
whatever actual messages each mailbox may have held.
Express protects against this attack with an auditing
protocol that checks to make sure (wA + wB) ∈ Fn is a
vector with at most one non-zero component. In other
words, the servers check that each write request updates
only a single mailbox. Any write request that fails this
check can be discarded to prevent it form corrupting the
contents of DA and DB. Riposte [14], a prior work that
also audits DPFs to protect against malicious clients, uses a
three-server auditing protocol that requires communication
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Ω(λ√n) and client computationΩ(√n) for a system with n
mailboxes, where λ is a security parameter. However, their
protocol takes advantage of the structure of a particular
DPF construction that is less efficient than the one used
by Express. Applying their protocol to the more efficient
DPFs used in Express would require client communication
and computation Ω(λn) and Ω(n) respectively as well as
the introduction of an additional non-colluding server. This
linear bandwidth consumption per write would create a
communication bottleneck in Express and increase client-
side computation costs significantly. Moreover, adding a
third server – and requiring that two out of three servers
remain honest to guarantee security – would dramatically
reduce the practicality of the Express system. To resolve
this issue, we introduce a new auditing protocol that
drops client computation (in terms of AES evaluations
and finite field operations) to O(1) and communication
to O(λ) while simultaneously eliminating the need for a
third server to perform audits. We describe our two-party
auditing protocol in Section 4.1.
Although auditing ensures thatDPFs sent by clientsmust
be well-formed, an attacker targeting Express has a second
avenue to disrupting the system. Instead of attempting to
corrupt the entire set of mailboxes – an attack prevented by
the auditing protocol – a malicious client can write random
data to only one mailbox and corrupt any message a source
may send to a journalist over that mailbox. Although this
attack is easily detectable when a journalist receives a
random message, it still allows for easy disruption of the
system and cannot be blocked by blind auditing because
the disruptive message is structured as a legitimate write.
We defend against this kind of targeted disruption with
a new application of virtual addressing. At a high level, we
assign each mailbox a unique 128-bit virtual address and
modify the system to ensure that writing into a mailbox
requires knowing the mailbox’s virtual address. In this
way, a malicious user cannot corrupt the contents of an
honest user’s mailbox, since the malicious user will not be
able to guess the honest user’s virtual address. We discuss
this defense and its implications for other components of
the system in Section 4.2.
4.1 Auditing to Prevent Disruption
This section describes our auditing protocol. We begin
with a rough outline of the protocol before stating the
security properties required of it and then explaining the
protocol in full detail. At a high level, our auditing protocol
combines the verifiable DPF protocol of Boyle et al. [34],
which only provides security against semi-honest servers,
with secret-shared non-interactive proofs (SNIPs) first
introduced by the Prio system [31] (and later improved
and generalized by Boneh et al. [37]) to achieve security
against fully malicious servers. We explain each of these
ideas and how we combine them below.
Let the vectors wA and wB ∈ Fn be the outputs that
servers A and B recover after evaluating fA(i), fB(i), for
i ∈ [n]. Note that even DPFs that output a message in
{0, 1}∗ begin with an element of a λ-bit field F and expand
it, so for the purposes of our auditing protocol, we can
assume that every DPF output is an element of F. We say
that w = wA + wB ∈ Fn is a valid write-request vector if
it is a vector in Fn of Hamming-weight at most one. The
goal of the auditing protocol is to determine whether a
given write-request vector is valid.
The observation of Boyle et al. [34] is that the following
n-variate polynomial equals zero with high probability
over the random choices of r1, ..., rn if and only if (1) there
is at most one nonzero wi and (2) m = wi for the value of
wi that is nonzero
f (r1, ..., rn) = (Σi∈[n]wiri)2 − m · (Σi∈[n]wir2i ).
This polynomial roughly corresponds to taking a ran-
dom linear combination of the elements of w – using
randomness shared between the two servers – and check-
ing that the square of the linear combination and the sum of
the terms of the linear combination squared are the same.
Using the fact that it is easy to compute linear functions on
secret-shared data, the two sums in the equation above can
be computed non-interactively by servers A and B. Boyle
et al. suggest using a multiparty computation between
the servers to compute the remaining multiplications and
check whether this polynomial in fact equals zero, thus
determining whether the DPF is valid.
The problem with this approach is that it is only secure
against semi-honest servers. Amalicious server can deviate
from the protocol and potentially learn which entry of w
is non-zero. For example, suppose a malicious server A is
interested in knowing whether a write request modifies an
index i∗. It runs the auditing protocol as described, but it
replaces its value wAi∗ with a randomly chosen value w′Ai∗ .
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If wAi∗ + wBi∗ = 0, i.e., i∗ was not the nonzero index of w,
this modification will cause the audit to fail because the
vector w′ that includes w′Ai∗ instead of wAi∗ no longer has
hamming weight one. Thus the malicious server learns
that the write request would not have modified index i∗. On
the other hand, if wAi∗ + wBi∗ , 0, i.e., i∗ was the nonzero
index of w, the inclusion of w′Ai∗ still results in a vector w
′
of hamming weight one, and the auditing protocol passes.
Thus the malicious server can detect whether or not the
write request modifies index i∗ by observing whether or
not auditing was successful after it tampers with its inputs.
To prevent this attack we make use of a SNIP proof
system [31, 37]. In a SNIP, a client sends each server a
share of an input w and an arithmetic circuit Verify(). The
client then uses a SNIP proof to convince the servers, who
only hold shares of w but may communicate with each
other, that Verify(w) = 1. An important property of a SNIP
proof system is that it provides security against malicious
servers. That is, even a server who deviates from the
protocol cannot abuse a SNIP to learn more about w. SNIP
proofs require computation and communication linear in
the number of multiplications between secret values in
the statement being proved. Our approach is to instantiate
the DPF verification protocol of Boyle et al. [34] inside
of a SNIP to protect it from potentially malicious servers.
Since the Boyle et al. verification protocol only requires
two multiplications between shared values, the squaring
and the multiplication by m, this results in a constant-sized
SNIP (i.e. size O(λ)).
Properties of auditing protocol. Before describing our
protocol in detail, we recall the completeness, soundness,
and zero-knowledge properties we require of the audit-
ing protocol (adapted from those of Riposte’s auditing
protocol [14]).
• Completeness. If all parties are honest, the audit al-
ways accepts.
• Soundness against malicious clients. If w is not a
valid write request (i.e., the client is malicious) and
both servers are honest, then the audit will reject with
overwhelming probability.
• Zero knowledge against malicious server. Infor-
mally: as long as the client is honest, an active attacker
controlling at most one server learns nothing about
the write request w, apart from the fact that it is valid.
That is, for any malicious server there exists an effi-
cient algorithm that simulates the view of the protocol
execution with an honest second server and an honest
client. The simulator takes as input only the public
system parameters and the identity of the malicious
server.
Our auditing protocol. Our auditing protocol proceeds
as follows. We assume that data servers A and B share a
private stream of random bits generated from a pseudo-
random generator with a seed r. In practice, the servers
generate the random seed by agreeing on a shared secret
at setup and using a pseudorandom generator to get a new
seed for each execution of this protocol. We will describe
the protocol using a SNIP as a black box and give details
on how to instantiate the SNIP in Appendix B.
At the start of the protocol, server A holds r and wA ∈
Fn and server B holds r and wB ∈ Fn, both generated
by evaluating the DPF shares sent by the client at each
registered mailbox address. The client holds the index i∗
at which w is non-zero as well as the values of wA and wB
at index i∗, which it can compute from the function shares
fA and fB that it sent to the servers.
1. Servers derive proof inputs.
The servers begin the protocol by sending the random
seed r used to generate their shared randomness to
the client.
Next, they compute sharesmA andmB ofm, the value
of w at its non-zero entry, which is simply the sum
of all the elements of wA or wB respectively because
all but one entry of w should be zero. That is, the
servers compute
mA← Σi∈[n]wAi and mB ← Σi∈[n]wBi .
Then servers A and B use their shared randomness r
to generate a random vector r = (r1, ..., rn) ∈ Fn and
then compute the vector of squares R = (r21 , ..., r2n) ∈
Fn. After this, they compute shares of the “check”
values c = 〈w, r〉 and C = 〈w, R〉:
cA← 〈wA, r〉 ∈ F, CA← 〈wA, R〉 ∈ F
cB ← 〈wB, r〉 ∈ F, CB ← 〈wB, R〉 ∈ F
Here the notation 〈x, y〉 represents the inner product
between vectors x, y ∈ Fn, defined as Σn
i=1xiyi .
At this point, the servers hold values mA, cA,CA and
mB, cB,CB respectively.
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2. Client derives proof inputs.
Since the client knows the seed r, the index i∗, and
the values of wA and wB at index i∗ (and as a conse-
quence the value of m = wAi∗ + wBi∗ ∈ F), the client
can compute the random values r∗, r∗2 that will be
multiplied by the i∗th entries of wA and wB. Since
all the values other than the i∗th entry of w are zero,
the client need not compute them. Thus the client
computes the check values c∗ = r∗ · (wAi∗ + ·wBi∗ )
and C∗ = r∗2 · (wAi∗ + ·wBi∗ ). Note that this allows
the client to compute the check values in only O(1)
time even though the servers must do O(n) work to
find them.
3. Proof computation and verification.
To complete the proof, the client prepares a SNIP
proof pi = (piA, piB), sends piA to server A, and sends
piB to server B. The servers then verify the proof,
communicating with each other as needed. The SNIP
proves that
c2 − m · C = 0
where c← cA + cB and C ← CA + CB.
The soundness property of the SNIP proof guarantees
that the servers will only accept the proof if the
statement is true, and the zero-knowledge property
of the proof guarantees that as long as one server is
honest, the servers learn nothing from receiving the
SNIP proof that they did not know before receiving it
(even if one server is fully malicious). Note that this
statement only involves two multiplications: c · c and
m · C.
We sketch the instantiation of the proofs used in our
auditing protocol as well as the security analysis of the
full auditing protocol in Appendix B. Full details and a
security proof for the SNIP proof system itself can be
found in the Prio paper [31] and the follow-up work of
Boneh et al. [37].
4.2 Preventing Targeted Disruption
We now describe how Express prevents a targeted attack
where a malicious client writes random data to just one
mailbox in order to corrupt its contents. Express servers
assign each mailbox a 128-bit virtual address and ensure
that a client can only write into a mailbox if it knows the
corresponding virtual address.
To implement this, the Express servers maintain an
array of n physical mailboxes, but they also maintain an
array of 2λ virtual mailboxes, where λ ≈ 128 is a security
parameter. The two data servers assign a unique virtual
address to each physical mailbox, and they collectively
maintain a mapping – a page table – that maps each active
virtual address to a physical mailbox. Since the virtual
addressing scheme’s only goal is to prevent misbehavior by
malicious clients, the servers both hold the contents of the
page table (i.e., the list of active virtual addresses and their
mapping to physical addresses) in the clear. The virtual-
address space (around 2128 entries) is vastly larger than the
number of physical mailboxes (around 220, perhaps), so
the vast majority of the virtual-address space goes unused.
When a client registers a new mailbox, the servers both
allocate storage for a new physical mailbox, assign a new
random virtual address to this physical mailbox, and update
their page tables. The address can either be chosen by one
server and sent to the other or generated separately by
each server using shared randomness. The servers then
return the virtual and physical addresses for the mailbox
to the client. As mentioned above, the owner of a mailbox
must communicate its address to others in order to receive
messages. We describe how this can be achieved when we
discuss dialing in Section 6.2. The contents of the tables
stored at the servers are shown in Figure 1.
When preparing a write request, the client prepares DPF
shares fA and fB : 2λ → F as if it were going to write in
to the exponentially large address space. However, instead
of evaluating shares at every i ∈ [2λ], the Express servers
only evaluate fA and fB at the currently active virtual
addresses. In this way, the number of DPF evaluations the
servers compute remains linear in the number of registered
mailboxes, even though clients send write requests as
if the address space were exponentially large. A client
who does not know the address for a given mailbox has
a chance negligible in λ of guessing the correct virtual
address. Note that this technique is only possible because
Express uses a DPF whose share sizes are logarithmic in
the function domain size. Using virtual addresses with
older square-root DPFs would result in infeasibly large
message sizes and computation costs.
Although virtual addressing, when combined with au-
diting, does fully resolve the issue of disruptive writes,
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Figure 1: Contents of the tables held by servers in Express. Each
server stores the conversion from virtual to physical addresses
and a distinct key for each mailbox. Combining data from the
two servers allows a user holding both keys for a given mailbox
to read its contents.
it does not fully abstract away physical addresses. Our
auditing protocol critically relies on the client knowing
the index of the mailbox it wants to write to among the
set of all mailboxes. As such, a client preparing to send a
message must be informed of both the virtual and physical
addresses of the mailbox it wishes to write to. Fortunately,
the size of a physical address is much smaller than that of
a virtual address (about 20 bits compared to 128 bits for a
virtual address), so communicating both addresses at once
adds little cost to only sending the virtual address.
5 Full Express Protocol
This section summarizes the full Express protocol de-
scribed incrementally in Sections 3 and 4.We will describe
the protocol in full but refer to the steps of the auditing
protocol as described in Section 4.1 to avoid repeating the
protocol spelled out in detail there. We prove security in
Appendix A.
We assume that a mailbox owner has already set up a
mailbox with virtual address v and physical address p and
communicated (p, v) to another client. We discuss options
for communicating p and v to other clients (“dialing”)
in Section 6.2. We also assume that the mailbox owner
holds mailbox keys kA and kB, which it has sent to servers
A and B respectively, and the client has a message m
that it wants to send. Server A holds vectors V of virtual
addresses, KA of keys, and DA of mailbox contents, each
of length n. Server B likewise holds V , KB and DB. Each
entry of DA and DB is encrypted in counter mode under
the corresponding key in KA or KB. Figure 1 shows the
information held by servers A and B for each mailbox.
Sending a message.
1. The client generates DPF shares fA and fB of the
point function fv,m : [2λ] → {0, 1} |m | . It sends fA to
A and fB to B.
2. A and B evaluate wA ← ( fA(V1), ..., fA(Vn)) and
wB ← ( fB(V1), ..., fB(Vn)). They use their shared
randomness to generate a seed r to be used in the
auditing protocol, send it to the client, and prepare
the server inputs to the SNIP.
3. The client prepares the client inputs to the SNIP and
generates the corresponding proof pi = (piA, piB). It
sends piA to server A and piB to server B.
4. The servers verify the SNIP proof pi, and they abort
if the verification fails.
5. Servers A and B decrypt each DAi with KAi and
each DBi with key KBi, i ∈ [n]. Next, they set DAi ←
DAi+wAi andDBi ← DBi+wBi before re-encrypting
the new values of DAi and DBi under the same keys
(with new nonces).
Checking a mailbox.
1. The mailbox owner sends (p, v) to servers A and B to
request to read from the mailbox at physical address
p.
2. Servers A and B check that virtual address v corre-
sponds to physical address p and then send DAp and
DBp as well as the nonce used for the encryption
of each value. Then they set the values of DAp and
DBp to fresh encryptions of 0 under KAp and KBp
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Client Servers
Communication O(λ2 + |m|) O(λ)
AES Evaluations O(λ + |m|) O(n(λ + |m|))
Field Operations O(1) O(n)
Figure 2: Complexity of processing a single write in Express
with n mailboxes, message size |m|, and security parameter λ.
Communication measures bits sent only.
respectively, emptying the mailbox. Since only the
mailbox owner and whoever wrote into a mailbox
know p and v, and the virtual address space for v is
huge, clients cannot read or delete the contents of
each other’s mailboxes.
3. The mailbox owner decrypts the values of DAp and
DBp it received with keys kA and kB to get messages
mAp and mBp . It outputs message m← mAp + mBp .
Complexity. Figure 2 shows the communication and com-
putational complexity of sending a message in Express
for the client and the servers. We measure computational
complexity in terms of AES evaluations and field opera-
tions separately to better capture the computation being
carried out by each party. The complexities reported are
the sum of costs due to DPF evaluation, re-encryption, and
auditing.
Client communication includes sending a DPF whose
shares are functions with domain size 2λ, resulting in
DPFs of size O(λ2 + |m|). As discussed in Section 4.1, the
auditing protocol involves the client sending a proof of
size O(λ).
Cryptographic costs on the client include generating
DPF shares and evaluating the DPF at one point, both
of which cost O(λ + |m|). The server, on the other hand,
must evaluate the DPF at each address and also generate
the random vectors needed for the auditing protocol. The
number of field operations for each party come directly
from the costs incurred during the auditing protocol.
6 Using Express forWhistleblowing
Having described the core Express system itself, this
section covers two important considerations involved in
using Express for whistleblowing: plausible deniability for
whistleblowers and agreeing on mailbox addresses.
First, in order to provide meaningful security in practice,
Express must hide both the recipient of a given client’s
message aswell aswhether a client is really communicating
with a journalist. We discuss how to provide plausible
deniability for Express clients in Section 6.1. Second,
to set up their communication channel, a journalist and
whistleblower must agree on a mailbox address through
which they will communicate. This can be done either in
person or via a dialing protocol as described in Section 6.2.
6.1 Plausible Deniability
We now turn to the goal of hiding whether or not a client
is really communicating with a journalist. If Express
were only to be used by journalists and their sources, it
would fundamentally fail to serve its purpose. Although
no observer could determine which journalist a given
message was sent to, the mere fact that someone sent a
message using Express reveals that she must be a source for
some journalist. In order to provide plausible deniability
to whistleblowers, other, non-whistleblowing users must
send messages through the system as well.
One solution for this problem, first suggested in the
Conscript system [38], is to have cooperative web sites
embed Javascript in their pages that generates and submits
dummy requests. For example, the New York Times home
page could be modified such that each time a consenting
user visits (or for every nth consenting user that visits),
Javascript in the page directs the browser to generate a
request to a special write-only Express dummy address that
the servers maintain but for which each server generates
its own encryption key not known to any user. Since no
user has the keys to unlock this address, messages written
to it can never be retrieved, and Express’s metadata-hiding
property guarantees that messages sent to the dummy
address are indistinguishable from real messages sent to
journalists. This enables creating a great deal of cover
traffic and gives clients who really are whistleblowers plau-
sible deniability. Moreover, only one large organization
needs to implement this technique for all news organiza-
tions who receive messages through Express to benefit
from the cover traffic.
Express is particularly well-suited to this approach for
two reasons: aligned incentives and low client side costs.
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First, participating news organizations all have web sites
and a natural incentive to direct cover traffic to the Express
system. Second, as demonstrated in Section 7, Express’s
extremely low client computation and communication
requirements lend themselves particularly well to this
approach, since the client can easily run in the background
on a web browser, even in computation or data-restricted
settings such as mobile devices. We empirically evaluate a
JavaScript version of the Express client in Section 7.2 and
find it imposes very little additional cost on the browser.
Using in-browser JavaScript to give users plausible de-
niability raises a number of security and ethical concerns.
We defer to the Conscript paper [38] for an extensive dis-
cussion of the security and ethical considerations involved
and note that it is also possible to generate cover traffic for
Express using a standalone client, as is common in other
systems.
6.2 Dialing
In order to use Express, a journalist and source must agree
on the mailbox address which the source will use to send
messages to the journalist. Journalists who make initial in-
person contact with sources could, for example, distribute
business cards with mailbox addresses on them in QR
code form.
Journalists and sources could also use a dialing pro-
tocol to share an initial secret before moving to Express
to communicate longer or more frequent messages. A
separate instance of Express itself can be used for dialing.
Journalists can register a number of dialing mailboxes and
publicize their addresses, e.g., on their websites or built
into an Express client. Anyone wishing to communicate
with a given journalist sends a message to one of that jour-
nalist’s dialing mailboxes with a random 128-bit address
(and perhaps some introductory text) which the journalist
can then register in the main Express system. This requires
mailbox owners to choose virtual addresses instead of
the servers, but the probability of colliding addresses is
low because the virtual address space is large. Since ad-
dresses are public in the dialing system, we could dispense
with virtual addressing for the dialing instance of Express
and use much shorter addresses, e.g., 30 bits to support
1,000,000,000 dialing mailboxes. This necessitates relying
on an external rate-limiting system to prevent denial of
service attacks on individual journalists’ mailboxes.
7 Implementation and Evaluation
We implement Express with the underlying cryptographic
operations (DPFs, auditing) in C and the higher level
functionality (servers, client) in Go. We use OpenSSL for
cryptographic operations in C and base our DPF imple-
mentation in part on libdpf [39], which is in turn based
on libfss [40, 41]. We also re-implemented the client-
side computations involved in sending a write request in
JavaScript for the whistleblowing application, using the
SJCL [42, 43] and TweetNaCl.js [44] libraries for crypto
operations. We implement the DPF construction [34] and
the auditing protocol using the field Fp of integers modulo
the prime p = 2128 − 159, since these field elements have
a convenient representation in two 64-bit words.
We evaluate Express on three Google Cloud instances
(two running the servers and a third to simulate clients)with
16-core intel Xeon processors (Haswell or later) with 64GB
of RAM each and 15.6 Gbps bandwidth.We run all three in
the same datacenter to minimize network latency and focus
comparisons to other systems on computational costs since
we begin our evaluation by considering communication
separately. We evaluate the JavaScript implementation of
the whistleblowing client on a laptop with an Intel i5-
2540M CPU @ 2.60GHz and 4GB of RAM running Arch
Linux and the Chromium web browser. All experiments
use security parameter λ = 128.
We compare Express to Riposte [14] and Pung [17],
two prior works that also provide cryptographic metadata-
hiding guarantees, albeit in slightly different settings. We
choose to compare to these systems because, like Express,
they also provide cryptographic security guarantees and
only rely on a small number of servers to provide their
security guarantees. Riposte requires 3 servers, of which
two must be honest (a stronger trust assumption than
Express) whereas Pung requires only a single server which
can potentially be malicious (a weaker trust assumption).
Where applicable, we discuss how Express compares to
Vuvuzela [21], although a direct quantitative comparison
is difficult due to the fundamentally different security
properties targeted by the two systems – Vuvuzela provides
differential privacy whereas Express and the other systems
we compare to provide cryptographic security. We rerun
the original implementations of Riposte and Pung on
the same cloud instances used to evaluate Express and
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Figure 5: Our auditing protocol dramat-
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parable to prior work, where audit compu-
tation time is dwarfed by DPF evaluation
anyway.
compare to Vuvuzela using results reported in its paper,
whose evaluation uses more powerful machines than we
do.
We find that Express reduces communication costs by
orders of magnitude compared to Riposte and Pung, with
clients using over 100× less bandwidth than Riposte and
over 4000× less bandwidth than Pung when sending a mes-
sage in the presence of one million registered mailboxes.
On the client implemented in C/Go, Express requires 20ms
of computation to send a write request, even in the presence
of one million registered mailboxes, and our JavaScript
client performs similarly, requiring 51ms for the same
task.
We compare the performance of our auditing protocol to
the prior protocol proposed by Riposte [14]. We find that
despite making a weaker trust assumption and requiring
only two servers, our protocol reduces client computation
time by several orders of magnitude, resulting in audit
compute time of under 5 microseconds regardless of the
number of registered mailboxes. Making the computa-
tional cost of auditing practically “for free” reduces client
compute costs in the complete Express system by 8× com-
pared to an implementation that uses the Riposte auditing
protocol.
On the server side, we show that Express’s throughput
and latency costs are better than prior work. We also
calculate the dollar cost of running each system to send
one million messages and find that Express costs 6×
less to operate than Riposte, the second cheapest system.
Throughout our experiments we generally compare to
prior work on message sizes comparable to or larger than
those used in their original evaluations. Since the recent
whistleblower’s report to the US intelligence community’s
inspector general contained 25.3KB of text [32] and last
year’s widely reported anonymous op-ed in the New York
Times contained about 9KB of text [33], we make sure to
evaluate Express on 32KB messages as well to ensure it
could handle such reports.
7.1 Communication Costs
Figures 3 and 4 show communication costs for each party
when sending a 160 Byte message and compares to costs in
Riposte [14] and Pung [17]. We use a smaller message size
than in our subsequent experiments to focus on measuring
the role of the DPF and auditing in communication costs.
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Communication costs always increase linearly with the
size of the messages being sent. Express’s communication
costs are constant regardless of the number of mailboxes,
compared to asymptotically
√
n in Riposte, the system
with the next lowest costs. For 214 mailboxes, Express
has 8.34KB of communication by the server and 5.39KB
by the client for each write. The corresponding costs in
Riposte are 208KB and 69KB, respectively, representing
communication reductions of 25× on the server side and
13× on the client. Riposte additionally requires a third
auditing server which incurs 13.8KB of communication,
whereas Express has no such requirement. For about
one million (220) mailboxes, Express requires 101× less
communication than Riposte on the client side and 195×
less on the server side. The communication reduction
compared to Pung in this setting is 4, 631× on the server
side and 7, 161× on the client side, reflecting the high
cost of providing security with only one server as Pung
does. Our communication savings come from using log-
sized DPFs that write into a large but fixed-size virtual
address space for write requests and from our new auditing
protocol whose communication costs do not increase with
the number of mailboxes.
7.2 Client Costs
Client computation time in both our native C/Go and
in-browser Javascript implementations remains constant
as the number of mailboxes on the server side increases:
since the client always prepares a DPF to be run on the
2128-sized virtual address space, the cost of preparing the
DPF does not grow with the number of mailboxes, and
the client-side auditing cost is constant as well. To send a
1KB message, our client takes 20ms in C/Go and 51ms in
Javascript. Combined with the low client communication
costs in Figures 3 and 4, this shows that an Express client
can easily be deployed as background Javascript in a web
page to create cover traffic, as explained in Section 6.1.
To further explore performance implications of an Ex-
press client being embedded on a major news site, we
measured the page load times of the New York Times,
Washington Post, and Wall Street Journal websites. On
average, these pages took 5.4, 3.4, and 2.2 seconds to
load completely (over a 50MBit/sec connection), so the
computation costs of our client in the browser are less
than 3% of current page load times and can occur in the
background without impacting user experience. We also
measured the sizes of the three websites (without caching)
at 4.9MB, 9.1MB, and 8.2MB, respectively. Our JavaScript
implementation with dependent libraries takes 72.5KB of
space, so adding our code would increase a site’s size by
less than 1.5%.
Auditing. In addition to enabling improved communi-
cation efficiency, as seen above, our auditing protocol
dramatically reduces computation costs for the client. Fig-
ure 5 shows the computation costs of our auditing protocol
as compared to the protocol used in Riposte [14], which we
re-implemented for the purpose of this experiment. Unlike
Riposte, where client and server computation costs for
auditing are comparable, our protocol runs in O(1) time
on the client, taking less than 5 microseconds regardless
of how many mailboxes are registered on the servers. This
is about 55, 000× less than the client computation cost for
auditing in Riposte for one million mailboxes and trans-
lates to overall client computation on our system running
8× faster than it would if it were using the Riposte auditing
protocol. In addition to the asymptotic improvement, our
protocol uses only hardware-accelerated AES evaluations,
whereas Riposte’s auditing protocol involves a mix of AES
evaluations and more costly SHA256 hashes.
Our auditing protocol’s performance is comparable to
Riposte on the server side, but it does not require a third
auditing server as Riposte does. The performance bottle-
neck on the servers is DPF evaluations, not auditing, so
server side performance improvements in auditing would
only result in negligible improvements in end-to-end per-
formance. As we will see, Express outperforms Riposte’s
overall throughput despite not significantly changing server
side auditing costs.
7.3 Server Performance
We nowmeasure the performance of Express on the server-
side. We measure the total throughput of the system, the
latency between when a client sends a message and when
the mailbox owner can read it, and the cost in dollars of
running Express.
Throughput. We compare Express’s throughput to Ri-
poste [14]. Figure 7 shows the comparison between Ex-
press and Riposte for 1KB messages, where throughput is
measured as the number of writes the servers can process
per unit time. Express’s throughput is 1.4-6.3× that of Ri-
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poste in our experiments, and Express’s throughput when
handling 32KB messages is comparable to Riposte when
handling only 1KB messages for up to about 50,000 mail-
boxes. Both systems are ultimately computation-bound by
the number of DPF evaluations required to process writes.
The graph shows the high throughput of each system
drop significantly as they shift from being communication-
bound to being computation-bound by DPF evaluations
for increasingly large numbers of mailboxes.
Like Express, Riposte uses DPFs to write messages
across two servers. Unlike Express, Riposte requires a third
party to audit user messages and must run its protocol in
rounds to provide anonymity guarantees to its users. The
rounds are necessary for Riposte’s anonymous broadcast
setting because all messages are public, so if messages
were revealed after each write, the author of a message
would clearly be whoever connected to the system last. In
contrast, Express messages can be delivered immediately
without waiting for a round to end.
Another difference between Express and Riposte is
that Riposte relies on a probabilistic approach based on
hashing for users to decide where to write with their DPF
queries. This means that there is a chance messages will
collide when written to the same address, rendering all
colliding messages unreadable. We evaluated Riposte with
parameters set to allow a failure rate of 5%, meaning
that 1 in 20 messages would be corrupted by a collision
and not delivered, even after Riposte’s collision-recovery
procedure. Express’s virtual address system avoids this
issue because the space of virtual addresses is so large that
collisions would only occur with negligible probability.
Latency. Since Express does not require any synchroniza-
tion between clients and the Express servers, the latency
of a write request consists only of the time for the servers
to process the request and for the mailbox owner to read
the message. Figure 6 shows how latency for processing
a single write request scales as the number of mailboxes
increases for various mailbox sizes. After about 10,000
mailboxes, or even 1,000 mailboxes for larger message
sizes, message processing becomes bound by the latency of
computing AES for each DPF evaluation, so total latency
increases linearly with the number of DPFs that must be
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evaluated (one per mailbox).
In prior metadata-hiding communication systems, mes-
sage delivery latency depends on the deployment-specified
round duration. As such, it is difficult to directly compare
latency in Express to prior work. We can, however, com-
pare to the computation time on the servers to process one
message and deliver it to its recipient in prior work. For
example, Riposte’s “latency” under this metric is simply
the time to process a DPF write and then run an audit.
A more interesting comparison is to see how Express’s
server-side costs compare to different architectures, such
as the single-server PIR-based approach of Pung [17] or
the differential privacy approach of Vuvuzela [21].
Since Pung [17] uses fast writes and more expensive
reads whereas Express has fast reads but expensive writes,
we run both systems with a write followed by a read,
as required by Pung’s messaging use case. As shown in
Figure 6, Express outperforms Pung by 1.3-2.6× when
run with 100-1,000,000 mailboxes for 1KB messages.
When we increase the message size to 10KB, we find that
Pung is 2 − 2.9× slower than Express and closely matches
Express’s performance on 32KB messages. Note that the
comparison to Pung is not quite apples to apples because
Pung operates in a stricter single-server security setting.
We also compare our latency to the reported latency of
Vuvuzela [21]. Vuvuzela’s end-to-end latency to deliver a
256 byte message for the lowest security setting on which
it was evaluated hovers around 8 seconds for 10,000 users
and 20 seconds for one million users. By comparison,
Express takes 210ms to write and then read a larger 1KB
message when there are 10,000 mailboxes and 15 seconds
when there are one million mailboxes. The higher latency
in Vuvuzela is due to cover traffic messages sent before a
message can be delivered.
Total system cost. Having measured Express’s throughput
and latency, we now turn to the question of Express’s cost
in dollars (USD). Our evaluation focuses on the dollar
cost of running the infrastructure required for Express
in the cloud and excludes human costs such as paying
engineers to deploy and maintain the software. The pri-
mary non-human costs in running Express, as with any
metadata-hiding system, come from running the necessary
servers and passing data through them. Using the data
from our evaluation thus far, we estimate the price of run-
ning Express to send one million messages using public
Google Cloud Platform pricing information. We calculate
the cost of running the system as the cost of hosting the
Express servers for the length of time required to process
one million messages plus the data passed between the
servers and back to the client (data passing into Google
cloud instances from clients outside is free). We price the
instances according to costs for various regions in the US
and Canada and calculate data charges using the prices
for data transfer between regions in the US and Canada
(for communication between servers) or with the public
internet (for communication with clients).
The results of this estimation process appear in Figure 8,
where we carry out similar calculations for Pung and
Riposte. As depicted in the figure, processing one million
messages with Express costs 5.9× less than Riposte, the
closest prior work measured, in the presence of 100,000
mailboxes. The high cost of running Pung comes from
its communication costs, where data egress charges far
outweigh the cost of hosting the system. On the other
hand, Express and Riposte incur smaller data costs, $0.05
per million messages in Express and $4.21 per million
messages in Riposte with one million registered mailboxes.
The large gap in cost between Express and Riposte comes
from hosting the servers themselves. Express’s higher
throughput means it can process one million messages
more quickly than Riposte, and the fact that it requires
only two servers, compared to three in Riposte, means that
the cost per hour of running Express is approximately 2/3
that of running Riposte.
Figure 8 does not include Vuvuzela [21], which provides
differentially private security instead of cryptographic secu-
rity. Not requiring cryptographic security allows Vuvuzela
to achieve higher throughput than cryptographic systems.
As such, it can process one million messages faster and
at lower cost, on the order of only several dollars. How-
ever, in addition to the difference in security guarantees,
Vuvuzela achieves its low price by pushing the true cost
of operating the system onto clients. In order to send and
receive messages, Vuvuzela clients must always remain
online.
8 Related Work
The most widely used anonymity system in use today is
without a doubt Tor [8], which relies on onion routing.
SecureDrop [9, 10] is a widely used Tor-based tool to allow
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sources to anonymously connect with journalists to give
tips. Although our work focuses on hiding metadata and
not on preserving anonymity, anonymity systems are often
used even when clients only wish to hide metadata. Tor
is unfortunately vulnerable to traffic analysis attacks if an
adversary controls enough of the network [11, 12, 13]. A
recent impossiblity result suggests that this limitation may
in some sense be necessary for anonymity systems [45].
Cryptographic security. Express belongs to a broad fam-
ily of works which aim to give cryptographic guarantees
regarding anonymity and metadata-hiding properties. One
category of works in this area include systems based on
mix-nets [30, 28, 46, 18, 47, 29, 48] which involve all
users in a peer to peer system participating in shuffling
messages [49, 27]. Later work has added verifiability to
this model [18] and outsourced the shuffling to a smaller
set of servers [47, 29]. Most recently, mixing techniques
have been extended to support large numbers of users in
Atom [19] and XRD [20]. Systems in this line of work
suffer from high latency due to the need to run many
shuffles and require participation by a large number of
servers run by different operators to achieve security.
Another class of cryptographic messaging solutions
use private information retrieval techniques [50, 51, 25,
34, 26, 52] to render reads or writes into a database of
mailboxes private and target a variety of use cases [14,
15, 16, 17, 53, 54, 55]. Express falls into this category.
Riposte [14] provides an anonymous broadcast mechanism
by using DPFs [25], and Talek [15] offers a private publish-
subscribe protocol. P3 [16] deals with privately retrieving
messages with more expressive search queries. Pung [17]
operates in a single-server setting and therefore requires
weaker trust assumptions that Express, but as we show in
Section 7, has higher costs than Express as well.
Differential privacy. Another class of works make differ-
ential privacy guarantees [56] instead of cryptographic
guarantees. These systems typically achieve better per-
formance but at the cost of setting a privacy budget
that dictates how much privacy the system will provide.
These works include Vuvuzela [21], Alpenhorn [22], Sta-
dium [23], and Karaoke [24].
9 Conclusion and Future Work
We have presented Express, a metadata-hiding commu-
nication system that requires only symmetric key cryp-
tographic primitives while providing near-optimal com-
munication costs. In addition to order of magnitude im-
provements in communication cost, Express reduces the
dollar cost of running a metadata-hiding communication
system by 6× compared to prior work. We feel that, in
addition to taking a strong step forward in lightweight
metadata-hiding communication systems that provide cryp-
tographic security guarantees, Express provides a practical
solution for metadata-hiding whistleblowing capable of
handling the real-world demands of this problem. Our
implementation is open source and available online at
https://github.com/SabaEskandarian/Express.
A natural extension to Expresswould be to go beyond the
one-out-of-two server securitymodel to onewithN servers,
where security holds so long as any one server remains
honest. This requires adapting Express write requests to
work with N servers rather than two. Our auditing protocol
naturally generalizes to more servers, but the DPFs we use
do not. Our virtual addressing technique relies on a DPF
with message sizes logarithmic in the domain of the point
function. Unfortunately, the efficient DPFs of Boyle et
al. [34], which we use, only apply to the two server setting,
and DPFs that support more than two servers require
reverting to constructions whose message sizes would
be O(λ√n) in the number of potential mailboxes [25],
a prohibitively large size for the 2128 virtual mailboxes
used by Express. An improvement in the underlying DPFs
would directly result in an efficient multi-server variant
of Express. We see this as an excellent open problem for
future work.
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A Security Arguments
This appendix formalizes and proves the soundness and
metadata-hiding security properties described in Section 2.
The proofs largely follow from the security of the auditing
protocol.
Soundness. We formalize soundness with the following
security game.
Definition 1 (Soundness). We define the following sound-
ness game SOUND[λ] played between an adversary A and
a challenger C who simulates the behavior of servers A
and B. Both A and C are given λ as input.
• Setup. Challenger C creates an initially empty list I of
compromised mailbox indexes. AdversaryA requests
creation of a number of mailboxes N of its choosing.
There are two ways in which it may create a mailbox:
1. Adversary A performs the role of a user inter-
acting with the servers to create a new mailbox.
Challenger C adds this mailbox to I.
2. Adversary A instructs C to create a mailbox
where C plays the role of both the user and the
servers, saving the user’s state (and in particular,
the mailbox keys) at the end of the registration
process.
• Queries and Corruptions. AdversaryA sends requests
to the servers, controlled by C. At any time, it may
send C a mailbox index i, at which point C will send
the saved state of the user who registered mailbox i
and add i to list I.
• Output. Challenger C performs a read on each reg-
istered mailbox. If |I | < N and any mailbox outside
of the list I contains nonzero contents, the adversary
wins the game.
We say amessaging scheme is sound if no PPT adversary
can win the soundness game above with greater than
negligible probability in the security parameter λ.
Claim. The Express scheme is sound.
Proof. The soundness proof follows closely from the
soundness of our auditing protocol. For each write request
sent to the Express servers, we consider two cases: where
the write modifies one mailbox and where the write modi-
fies more than one mailbox. If a write modifies more than
one mailbox, then it will not be applied to the database
of mailboxes, except with negligible probability in λ, by
the soundness property of the auditing protocol. This
means that we must only consider writes that modify a
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single mailbox. The adversary does not know the virtual
addresses of mailboxes outside of I, but it only wins the
soundness game if it produces a DPF that writes to the
address of a mailbox outside of I. This can only occur with
probability 2−λ (for λ = 128 in our instantiation of the
protocol), which is also negligible. Thus an adversary can
only win the soundness game with probability negligible
in λ. 
Metadata-hiding. We can formalize the definition of
metadata-hiding by requiring that there exists an efficient
simulator algorithm Sim that, given the list ` of honest
clients who connect with the servers, produces an output
which is computationally indistinguishable from the view
of an adversary A who controls any number of users and
one server while processing requests from the remaining
honest users, subject to the restriction that the recipients
of the messages from honest users are never among those
controlled byA. More specifically, ` should include which
client connects, time of connection, and size of message
transmitted for each connection made to the compromised
server by an honest client. Given this information, the
client can simulate the content of the messages sent by the
honest client.
This definition satisfies our intuitive notion of metadata-
hiding because it means that for each message, the server
learns nothing about who the message is sent to, as every-
thing it learns about who a message is sent to could be
simulated before it even sees the request. This information
would be contained in the content of the honest client’s
messages, which are not given to the simulator. We sketch
a proof of the metadata-hiding security argument below.
The proof relies on the zero-knowledge property of the
auditing protocol, the privacy of the DPFs used, and the
security of the encryption used for access control.
Claim (Informal). There exists an algorithm Sim that,
given the list ` of honest client connections to the Express
servers, simulates the view of an adversaryAwho controls
one Express server and any number of clients while the
servers process write requests, subject to the restriction
that the recipients of the honest clients’ messages are never
among those controlled by A.
Proof (sketch). Sim simulates write requests from honest
users and the process of auditing them by invoking the
simulator implied by the zero-knowledge property of the
auditing protocol. Note that this in turn uses the simulator
implied by the definition of DPF privacy to generate
DPF function shares. Moreover, whenever malicious users
request to read the contents of mailboxes, the simulated
honest server(s) returns encryptions of zero.
The proof that this simulator gives the adversary A a
view indistinguishable from interaction with a real honest
server and honest users is fairly straightforward. First, since
the adversary knows the virtual addresses of honest users’
mailboxes, as well as one of the two keys needed to read
the contents of those mailboxes (if it has compromised one
of the servers), it can send read requests for the contents
of honest mailboxes. However, since the adversary does
not see the second key to any honest users’ mailboxes, we
invoke the semantic security of the encryption scheme
used to protect honest mailbox contents to show that the
messages returned from read requests to an honest server
are indistinguishable from encryptions of zero.
From here, just as in the case of soundness, the proof
follows from the security of the auditing scheme. From
the zero-knowledge property of the auditing scheme, we
know that the view of either server in the auditing protocol
can be simulated. But the view of each server in Express’s
auditing protocol is the same as the view of that server in
the overall protocol, since the server’s view only consists
of its shares of the proof input (in the compressed form of
a DPF share from which it derives the actual inputs) and
the proof messages themselves. 
B SNIPs and Analysis of Auditing
Protocol
This appendix sketches the instantiation of the proofs used
in our auditing protocol as well as the analysis of the full
auditing protocol itself. Full details and a security proof for
this proof system can be found in the Prio paper [31]. We
include the instantiation of the proof here for completeness,
including some improvements described in the follow-up
work of Boneh et al. [37].
The size of a SNIP proof is linear in the number of
multiplication gates in the arithmetic circuit representing
the statement to be proved. In our case, there are 2 multipli-
cations. The client numbers the gates as 1 and 2. The idea
of the proof is to create three polynomials f , g, and h such
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that f , g represent the left and right inputs of each gate and
h to the outputs of each gate. f is the polynomial defined
by the points (0, rf ), (1, c), (2,m), and g is the polynomial
defined by the points (0, rg), (1, c), (2,C), where rf and rg
are random values chosen by the client. Observe that the
servers already hold shares of each point used to define f
and g except the random values rf and rg, shares of which
must be included in the SNIP proof.
Next, h is defined as the polynomial representing the
expected outputs of eachmultiplication gate, or the product
f · g. Since each of f and g will be of degree 2, h will be
of degree 4. The client can compute h from f and g and
must send shares of the description of h to each server as
part of the proof.
Since the servers now have shares of the inputs and
outputs of each multiplication from f , g, and h, they
only need to check that f · g = h to be convinced that
this relationship holds among their inputs. They do this
by evaluating each polynomial at a random point t and
checking equality. To compute the produce f (t) · g(t), the
servers simply evaluate their shares of each function and
publish the result. This reveals nothing about f or g except
their value at the point t.
The Prio paper [31] and the improvements of Boneh
et al. [37] give full proofs of completeness, soundness,
and zero-knowledge for this protocol. As a minor opti-
mization, instead of sending one proof as described above,
we send two separate SNIPs, one for each of the two
multiplications. This results in a slightly larger proof size
but simplifies the polynomial multiplications because the
polynomials f , g become linear and h becomes quadratic.
The security properties of the protocol are unchanged by
this modification.
Analysis. Having described the relevant building blocks,
we now sketch the analysis of our full auditing protocol.
The security properties of our auditing scheme follow
directly from those of the two protocols we combine to
build it (which we do not re-prove here). Completeness
follows directly from the completeness of the verifiable
DPF protocol of Boyle et al. as well as the completeness
of SNIPs.
Likewise, soundness follows directly from the soundness
of these two building blocks, with soundness error equal
to the sum of the soundness error of the DPF verification
protocol and the SNIP. We prove the following claim.
Claim. If the servers begin the auditing protocol holding
vectors wA ∈ Fn and wB ∈ Fn such that w = wA +
wB ∈ Fn is a vector of Hamming-weight greater than one,
then the audit will reject, except with error probability
 = O(1/|F|).
By takingF to be a field of size 2λ, for security parameter
λ, we can make the error probability  negligibly small in
λ.
The claim is true because the auditing protocol will only
accept a false proof if (1) the difference c2−mC = 0 for aw
that has more than one non-zero entry, or (2) the soundness
of the SNIP fails to enforce that only inputs satisfying this
relationship will be accepted. But the probability of (1) is
negligible in |F| by the security of the DPF verification
protocol of Boyle et al. [34], and the probability of (2) is
negligible in |F| by the soundness of SNIPs [31, 37]. By a
union bound, the soundness error of the overall protocol
is at most the sum of the soundnes errors of the verifiable
DPF protocol and the SNIPs.
To prove the zero-knowledge property, we must show
that there exists a simulator algorithm Sim that can pro-
duce outputs whose distribution is computationally indis-
tinguishable from the view of the servers in an execution
of the Express auditing protocol where the sum wA + wB
corresponds to a vector with a single non-zero entry. This
algorithm will interact with a potentially malicious adver-
sary A who plays the role of the server whose view is
being simulated. This proves the security of the protocol
because it shows that an adversary can learn anything it
would learn from actually participating in the protocol by
running Sim on its own.
The construction of Sim and subsequent proof of se-
curity follow almost directly from the original proof of
security for SNIPs used in Prio [31]. To see why, observe
that the view of each server in the auditing protocol con-
sists of the server’s DPF share, the server’s share of the
proof, and any messages sent between the servers dur-
ing the proof. The only difference between this and the
standard SNIP simulator is that the server’s inputs are
compressed in the form of DPF shares instead of being
stated explicitly as the vector wA or wB. In essence, the
DPF can be thought of as an efficient way to encode the
server’s inputs to the proof. To bridge this difference be-
tween our protocol and the original SNIP, we make one
small change to the SNIP simulator. The original SNIP
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simulator samples the server’s input share at random. Our
modified SNIP simulator will sample the server’s input
shares using simulated DPF shares instead. We can do this
because the privacy property of the DPF states that shares
can be simulated. Since the proof of zero-knowledge is
otherwise identical, we defer to the prio paper for the full
proof [31].
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